University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Communication Studies Faculty Publications

Communication Studies

Winter 2002

Rhetorical Traction: Definitions and Institutional
Arguments in Judicial Opinions About Wilderness
Access
Steven J. Schwarze
University of Montana - Missoula, steven.schwarze@umontana.edu

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/communications_pubs
Recommended Citation
Schwarze, Steven J., "Rhetorical Traction: Definitions and Institutional Arguments in Judicial Opinions About Wilderness Access"
(2002). Communication Studies Faculty Publications. 12.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/communications_pubs/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Communication Studies at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Communication Studies Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

A R G U M E N T A T IO N A N D A D V O C A C Y
3 8 (W in ter 2002): 1 3 1 -1 5 0

T H E JOURNAL O F T H E AM ERICAN F O R E N S IC ASSOCIATION

ARGUMENTATION
riru
-ADVOCACY
RHETORICAL TRACTION: DEFINITIONS AND
INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS INJUDICIAL
OPINIONS ABOUT WILDERNESS ACCESS
Steve Schwarze*
Almost every spring for the past eight
years, I m ade a phone call to M aryland in
order to get into M innesota. A n office in
M aryland houses the reservation system for
the Boundary W aters C anoe A rea W ilder
ness, a one-million acre preserve in the
northeastern tip of M innesota that is the
m ost visited unit of the N ational W ilderness
Preservation System. This office acts as a
m edium of and barrier to m y access to the
W ilderness; it issues perm its to groups of
people wishing to enter the B oundary W a
ters, and it limits the num ber of parties that
m ay enter at a given point on a particular
day. Although the W ilderness is public land,
I m ust first gain perm ission from a state in
stitution to enter the B oundary W aters.
T hat perm it is only one of the keys
needed to unlock the d oor to the Boundary
W aters. I also m ust pass through a ranger
station on the day I enter to confirm m y
perm it and ensure that I view a short video
* Steve Schwarze is an Assistant Professor in the Department o f
Communication Studies at the University o f Montana. An
earlier version o f this essay was presented a t the 2000
N atio n al C o m m u n icatio n A ssociation C o n v en tio n ,
S eattle, W A , T h e a u th o r thanks Shiv G anesh, S ara
H ay d en , C h ristin e O rav ec, E dw ard S chiappa, an d the
an o n y m o u s review ers for th eir helpful feedback on
this essay.

about the wilderness ethic of “Leave No
Trace.” Going into the wilderness does not
m ean m erely entering a supposedly u n 
tainted, uninhabited area; it requires that
people interact with the environm ent in
ways that the Forest Service has deem ed
appropriate. Indeed, m y yearly trips to the
Boundary W aters involve m ore than just
packing up m y gear and heading north;
m ore than catching fish and m aking cam p
fires; m ore than escaping the sights and
sounds of the city and relaxing in solitude.
These trips require m e to play by the rules
set by the state. T he rules and regulations,
the perm its and videos, all affect m y sheer
physical presence in the wilderness. Passing
through the wilderness m eans passing
through the state.
W ilderness, as it has com e to be articu
lated in the U nited States, is neither an in
herent quality of the natural world, nor a
state of mind. N or is it the cultural commonsense about wilderness, the dom inant m ode
of speaking and writing about wilderness.
For better or worse, wilderness is a construc
tion o f state institutions. A lthough environ
mentalists, philosophers and ethicists have
written prolifically about the m eaning o f wil-
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dem ess and its contradictions,1 scholars
have given far less attention to the question
o f how these m eanings and contradictions
get resolved by governing institutions for the
practical purpose of m anaging wilderness ar
eas.2 This essay addresses that question by
exam ining argum ents produced by govern
ing institutions that have a direct im pact on
the m anagem ent and hum an experience of
established wilderness areas. I take as m y
case studies the controversies concerning
wilderness m anagem ent in two areas: the
Boundary W aters C anoe A rea W ilderness in
M innesota and the wilderness portion of D e
nali N ational Park in Alaska.
Specifically, I focus m y attention on ju d i
cial opinions that address the issue o f m otor
ized access to the Boundary W aters and D e
nali. I exam ine judicial opinions because
they are texts by which state institutions p ro 
vide tem porary resolutions of ongoing p u b 
lic controversies. Especially in the last de
cade, individuals and interest groups have
engaged in several controversies in order to
influence public policy regarding the use of
trucks, off-road vehicles and snowmobiles as
m odes of access and recreation on federal
lands, including wilderness areas.
Advocates of m otorized use have ex
ploited ambiguity in wilderness legislation
and m anagem ent plans to gain rhetorical
traction for argum ents about m otorized use
in certain areas of designated wilderness.
These argum ents often get lodged in the
1 A good starting point for understanding the philo
sophical debates about the idea o f wilderness is the
collection of essays edited b y j . Baird Callicott and M i
chael P. N elson. M uch of the w ork in this collection is
indebted to R oderick N ash’s intellectual history o f the
idea of wilderness in the U nited States.
2 Both M ichael M cCloskey and M ark W oods analyze
the definition of wilderness in the 19GI W ilderness Act.
D aniel R ohlf and Douglas L. H onnold interpret the legal
fram ew ork o f wilderness m anagem ent, assessing how
the definition o f wilderness has been p ut to use in the
m anagem ent o f wilderness areas an d the adjudication of
lawsuits brought against the Forest Service. T h e present
essay extends the w ork o f R ohlf and H onnold by exam 
ining b y analyzing legal argum ents about a recent issue
in wilderness m anagem ent: m otorized access.
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courts, where ambiguities in policy get re
solved by judicial opinions.
This essay dem onstrates that judicial opin
ions rely on two related types of argum ent to
resolve ambiguities in wilderness policy: def
initional argum ents and institutional argu
ments. Judicial opinions surrounding m otor
ized use em ploy definitional arguments in
order to clarify ambiguous policy prescrip
tions regarding wilderness management.
H ow ever, these definitional arguments often
get resolved through argum ents about insti
tutional authority. Decisions about which
definition shall be accepted get supported by
argum ents about the specific governing insti
tution that has authority to establish that def
inition. In fact, ongoing philosophical de
bates about the m eaning of wilderness fade
into the background as courts attem pt to fix
definitional authority within a particular in
stitution. W ithin the courts, then, institu
tional argum ents have prim acy over defini
tional arguments. Institutional arguments
provide justification for the court’s resolution
or deferral of definitional arguments.
Identifying these two types of argum ent
and the relationship between them is useful
for elaborating theories o f rhetoric and argu
m entation and for assessing rhetorical strat
egies in current m otorized use controversies.
In terms of rhetorical theory, this essay con
tributes to ongoing discussions about the
characteristics and functions of definitions in
processes of argum entation.3 It does so by
specifying institutional argum ents as a signif
icant influence on definitions that get fixed as
part of the policy process. Recent essays
have identified other influences on defini
tions, such as political and econom ic inter
ests (Schiappa 1996), racist beliefs (McGee),
and the ideology of norm alcy (Titsworth).
3 As a set o f case studies, this essay takes up the call of
both Douglas W alton and D avid Zarefsky. T hey suggest
that scholars studying the use o f definitions in public
argum ents engage in case studies, in order to “show how
definitions are actually used in different contexts as ar
gum entative m oves.” (W alton 132).
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Scholars also have identified a variety of
influences on the definitions of wilderness
and related term s in public policy (Callicott
and Nelson; N ash; Oelschlager). W hile both
the argum entation literature and the wilder
ness literature successfully discern forces that
m otivate particular definitions, the cases dis
cussed in this essay point to another influence-argum ents about institutional authority—that has little to do with the definitions
themselves. T hat is, regardless of the beliefs
and assumptions that m ight have contrib
uted to definitions of “wilderness” or notions
of w hat counts as an appropriate m eans of
“access” to wilderness areas, the definitions
that get fixed b y judicial opinions are ulti
m ately justified by the courts through the use
of argum ents regarding institutional author
ity. Thus, it is im portant for argum entation
scholars to consider institutional argum ents
as yet another im portant influence on the
resolution of definitional issues in policy ar
guments.
Second, this essay contributes to scholar
ship that explores institutional argum ent, es
pecially in the realm of environm ental issues
(Doxtader; Peterson). It does so b y showing
how argum ents about institutional authority
function to negotiate the legitimacy of gov
erning institutions. As Erik D oxtader has
claimed in his work on institutional argu
m ent, “Discussions of particular policy
choices often affirm the general authority of
institutional practices of reasoning and cod
ify norm s of public interest" (185). In the
cases I exam ine, policy prescriptions about
motorized access ultimately turn on arguments
about institutional authority. By explaining
and clarifying the relationship betw een insti
tutional and definitional argum ents, I intend
to show how institutional argum ents operate
as a specific form o f argum ent that not only
shapes the concrete execution of public pol
icy but also contributes in com plex ways to
the legitimation of state power.
T o the extent that these argum ents con
tribute to the legitimation of state power,
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they also play an im portant role in the p ro 
cesses of hegem ony that have draw n the
attention of several theorists and critics in
com m unication studies. This points to a
third theoretical contribution of the essay; it
suggests that studies of hegem ony could ben 
efit by accounting for the specific role that
state rhetorics play in the process o f consent
formation. W hile m any studies of hegem ony
have exam ined civil society rhetorics in or
der to challenge the notion of a monolithic,
univocal “dom inant ideology,” this turn to
ward civil society has often neglected how
state institutions contribute the hegem onic
process. T he m otorized access cases show
how institutional argum ents intended to clar
ify the authority of state institutions can si
multaneously erode the legitimacy of those
institutions. If the analysis of hegem ony is
concerned with the process of negotiating
consent to the established order, then it is
imperative to analyze the rhetorics by which
the established order contributes to consent
and dissent.
O n a more practical level, m y analysis can
help critics and advocates assess arguments
about m otorized use on other public lands.
Arguments about access in the Boundary
W aters and D enali have re-em erged in other
m anagem ent controversies. T he Interior D e
partm ent’s proposed ban on snowmobiles in
national parks is an especially salient exam 
ple of how argum ents get taken up in new
controversies. An Anchorage Daily News arti
cle about a 1999 lawsuit over snowmobile
regulations in Denali encapsulates this argu
m entative move: “Both sides say the case
could carry weight far beyond the borders of
Denali. T he debate has com e to symbolize a
much broader struggle over snowmachining
in Alaska and in national parks across the
country” (Komamitsky). Public arguments
by advocates for m otorized use provide clear
evidence for such an assertion. Advocates
have continued to pursue argum ents about
access during the process of developing the
W inter Use Plan in Yellowstone and G rand

i.
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Teton N ational Parks, proposed off road ve
hicle bans on other federal lands, and the
Bureau of Land M anagem ent’s proposed
National Off-Highway V ehicle Strategy. In
the conclusion of the essay, I briefly discuss
how m y analysis provides a useful point of
departure for interpreting and intervening in
other m anagem ent controversies.
T he essay is divided into three major-sec
tions. In the first two sections, I analyze the
judicial opinions in the B oundary W aters
and D enali controversies. I introduce each of
these sections by contextualizing the contro
versies in relation to the ambiguous term s of
federal wilderness policy. In the analysis, I
explain how the am biguity of key term s such
as “wilderness,” “feasible” m eans of “ac
cess,” and “traditional activities” allow advo
cates to gain rhetorical traction for their p o 
sitions; but ultimately, the courts resolve
these ambiguities through argum ents about
institutional authority. In the third section, I
expand on the theoretical and practical im 
plications suggested above.
D e f in in g “ F e a s ib l e ” : T h e C a s e
of the B o undary W aters
T he issue of m otorized portages has been
at the heart of the ongoing m anagem ent con
troversies in the B oundary W aters Canoe
A rea W ilderness. Travel from one lake to
another in the Boundary W aters often in
volves portaging canoes and equipm ent
around rapids and other impasses. Although
m ost portages force travelers to carry their
gear across footpaths from one body of water
to the next, a few of the longer and m ore
rugged portages have been developed as m e
chanical portages. Initially used for logging
operations in the early p art of the 20th cen
tury (Proescholdt 4 6 -4 7 ), these m echanical
portages have since been staffed by private
truck operators who help travelers load gear,
boats and canoes onto flatbed trucks and
then transport the gear over portages to the
next lake or river. These portages have long
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been a point of dispute betw een wilderness
preservation groups and local interest
groups. W ilderness groups (in particular, the
Friends of the Boundary W aters) have
sought to eliminate the portages and argue
persistently against exceptions and loop
holes in the W ilderness A ct of 1964 and the
Boundary W aters A ct of 1978 that allow
forms o f m otorized travel in the Boundary
W aters. O ther local interest groups (such as
Conservationists with Com m on Sense) have
defended m otorized m odes of travel as his
torically accepted patterns of use on certain
lakes and portages and have argued that
these patterns have been codified in federal
legislation.
T he voices from these groups, however,
m ust also contend with the voice of C on
gress and the Forest Service, the agency with
m anagem ent responsibility for the Boundary
W aters. A lthough Congress m andated the
elimination o f nearly all m echanized forms
of travel with the passage of the W ilderness
A ct and the Boundary W aters Act, a clause
in the Boundary W aters Act kept three m o
torized portages open until Jan u ary 1, 1984.
T he A ct m andated closure of these portages
unless the Forest Service found “no feasible
nonm otorized m eans of transporting boats
across the portages” (Boundary W aters Act,
Section 4(f)).
T he ambiguity of the term “feasible” in
this clause provided rhetorical traction for
advocates, sustaining the controversy well
beyond the 1984 deadline and resulting in
two judicial opinions in the early 1990s that
I will analyze in this section of the essay.
Initially, the Forest Service declared that on
the basis of their field trials, there was no
feasible alternative to m otorized portages,
thus keeping the three portages motorized.
W ilderness preservation groups fought this
decision (among others) through the adm in
istrative appeals process, but failed to
achieve closure of those portages. Finally, in
Jan u ary 1990 wilderness groups brought ac
tion in federal district court to overturn the
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Forest Service’s decision. In 1991, the Dis
trict C ourt upheld the Forest Service, but in
1992, the Appeals C ourt reversed that deci
sion (Friends o f the Boundary Waters Wilderness
v. Robertson, 1991 and 1992). T h e Suprem e
C ourt refused to h ear a subsequent appeal
brought b y local interest groups. In both the
District C ourt decision and the Appeals
C ourt reversal, the crux o f the opinions was
the judicial interpretation of the term “feasi
ble.”

T h e D istrict C ourt O p in io n
T he plaintiffs in the District C ourt case,
wilderness preservation groups, claim ed that
there is a “feasible” m eans of boat transpor
tation: portage wheels. Based on their own
tests as well as those perform ed by the Forest
Service, preservationist groups claim ed it is
possible (therefore, in their view, “feasible”)
for travelers to use these wheels to assist
hum an-pow ered transportation across p o r
tages. The preservationists sought judicial re
view of the agency’s decision because, in
their view, the decision to m aintain the m o
torized portages violated the Boundary W a
ters Act, the W ilderness Act, and “the obli
gation delegated to [the Forest Service
Chief] by Congress to m anage the Boundary
W aters with a presum ption in favor of wil
derness values” (Friends v. Robertson, 1991,
1388-1389).
T h e defendants, the U nited States Forest
Service, argued that the C ourt should “defer
to the administrative finding of nonfeasibil
ity,” since the B oundary W aters Act “leaves
this decision to the C hief of the Forest Ser
vice” (1389). T here are two significant ele
m ents to this argum ent, one definitional and
the other institutional. First, the Forest Ser
vice claims that no nonm otorized m eans of
transportation fits the definition of “feasible.”
As evidence, they offer results of their field
studies that show how transporting boats
physically generated significant health and
safety risks. Given this evidence, the Forest
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Service suggests that physically transporting
equipm ent over portages does n o t fall under
the definition of “feasible.” Second, this def
initional argum ent works hand in hand with
an institutional argum ent about the appro
priate authority for determ ining this defini
tion. The Forest Service claims that C on
gress delegated decisions about “feasible”
transportation to the agency; therefore, the
Forest Service’s decision should not be a
m atter for legal dispute. Thus, the argum ent
of the Forest Service hinges both on a defi
nition of “feasible” as well as a determ ination
of which governing institution has the au
thority to define the term.
The first part of the court’s opinion shows
how these institutional and definitional ques
tions are intertwined. To judge the com pet
ing definitional claims, the District C ourt
turns to the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA) and a series of precedent cases to
provide the appropriate scope for their re
view. This results in the court articulating the
doctrine of “substitute judgm ent,” which lim
its the institutional authority of the court:
“Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultim ate standard
of review is a narrow one. T he court is not
em pow ered to substitute its judgm ent for
that of the agency” (1389). This limitation on
the court’s authority marks an im portant in
stitutional influence on the definition of “fea
sible.” T he APA provides param eters for ju 
dicial review of agency decisions, and makes
clear that while the court m ust “consider
w hether the decision was based on a consid
eration of the relevant factors and w hether
there has been a clear error of judgm ent,” it
cannot replace the agency’s decision with its
own judgm ent.
H owever, the court does have the author
ity to interpret statutes; thus, the court’s def
initions of statutory terms and phrases have
authority in the developm ent of m anage
m ent policy. In this opinion, the court en
gages almost exclusively in definitional argu
ments to support their opinion. As the court

I
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puts it, “This case ultim ately turns on the
meaning of ‘feasible’ as used in the BWCAW
Act” (1390). T o generate this definition, the
court turns to a Suprem e C ourt decision,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, which exam 
ined the use of the w ord “feasible” in a case
about building a highway through a city
park. H ow ever, the court asserts that the
Overton Park case is not a “direct analogue” to
the Boundary W aters case, and so they do
not simply use the definition of “feasible”
from Overton Park. R ather, the court says that
in Overton Park the Suprem e C ourt consid
ered the definition of “feasible” within the
context of that particular park. So, the Dis
trict C ourt proceeds by constructing the con
text of “wilderness” in order to define feasi
bility within the Boundary W aters.
This strategy of contextualization requires
the court to m ake a definitional argum ent
about the m eaning of “wilderness.” H ow 
ever, the court’s interpretation of the statu
tory language regarding “wilderness” also al
lows the court to develop a questionable
position regarding “access” as a fundam ental
purpose of wilderness m anagem ent. Invok
ing the definition of wilderness used in the
1964 W ilderness Act, the court claims that
the words of the act “ring hollow if this
carefully protected wilderness is without h u 
m an appreciators” (1390). W ith this asser
tion, the court sets up a logic of balancing
that they believe underlies wilderness p ro 
tection. T he court says that the Boundary
W aters Act “seeks to balance protections of
wilderness with public access to that w ilder
ness” (1391). In this logic, the desire for a
protected wilderness m ust be balanced with
the desire for an accessible wilderness that
can be appreciated b y hum an beings.
This balancing act is based on two ques
tionable rhetorical moves. First, the court
positions access and preservation as equally
im portant policy objectives, even though the
term “access” appears now here in the W il
derness Act. Through this positioning, the
court creates an obligation (insuring access
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for all) that is not stated in the statutory
definition of wilderness. Fram ing wilderness
m anagem ent in terms of these allegedly
equal objectives makes it easier for the court
to refute argum ents for limiting access. Sec
ond, the court tries to emphasize the im por
tance of access by describing a hypothetical
situation of a wilderness so strictly “pre
served” that it would be “w ithout hum an
appreciators.” This is a red herring: the situ
ation is neither what the m anagem ent plan
proposes, nor what the W ilderness Act
states. T he plan does not prohibit access or
prevent appreciation; it m erely limits the type
o f transportation one m ay use in specific areas.
Further, the A ct explicitly requires wilder
ness areas to provide “outstanding opportu
nities for solitude or a primitive and uncon
fined type of recreation” (Section 2(c)).
Overall, then, the District C ourt’s opinion
invokes a version of “wilderness” that pre
sents wilderness m anagem ent as the out
com e of a precarious balancing act between
preservation and access. W hile this balanc
ing act m ay help the court argue against
further regulation of access in the Boundary
W aters, it poses a false dilem m a that ignores
the parts of the statute and the proposed
m anagem ent plan that give prim acy to pro
tecting the wilderness.
Nonetheless, after defining access as a fun
dam ental goal of the W ilderness Act, the
court proceeds to interpret the Boundary
W aters Act in light of this goal. In effect, the
court’s opinion defines “feasible” in a way
that favors access over preservation. To de
velop this definition, the court makes two
arguments about how a ban on motorized
access would subvert Congress’s intent in
including the term “feasible” in the Act.
First, Congress obviously could not have in
tended “feasible” to function as producing a
universal ban on m otorized access, since the
B oundary W aters Act contains language that
does ban other m otorized portages. H ad
Congress intended a universal ban, the court
argues, they could have written that into the
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law instead of providing a clause allowing
for access alternatives. Second, the legisla
tive history of the B oundary W aters A ct also
precludes a universal b an on m otorized ac
cess. Since the A ct clearly accom m odated
com peting interests regarding wilderness,
and since earlier versions of the bill argued
for a com plete ban on m otorized access, the
feasibility criterion could not have been in
tended to require com plete elim ination of
the motorized portages. H ow ever, these two
arguments suggest only that the feasibility
criterion cannot be interpreted as requiring
an absolute ban. T hey leave open the possi
bility that m otorized portages could be elim
inated, unless the Forest Service determ ined
that there was no feasible alternative.
Im portantly, the latter phrase emphasizes
that the Forest Service ultim ately has the
institutional authority to define “feasible.”
T h e District C ourt’s opinion simply uses a
series of definitional argum ents to declare
the Forest Service’s definitions and decision
to be reasonable. Referring to the definition
articulated by the Forest Chief, the court
states, “M ore fundam entally, ‘feasible,’ as
used in the context of a wilderness which is
to be available to the general citizen ry
is
m ore properly thought of as ‘reasonably
convenient or usable’” (1392). T he court
goes on to concur with the C h iefs decision
in a way consistent with their earlier con
cerns about access: “H ere the Chief, and this
Court, m ust focus on matters of hum an ca
pabilities in conjunction with citizen access
to a m anaged wilderness. W hen viewed in
this light, the Court concludes that the Chiefs
decision is in accord with the BW CA W Act,
the W ilderness Act, and pru d en t wilderness
m anagem ent” (1392). In the end, an argu
m ent about institutional authority, coupled
with questionable definitional argum ents re 
garding “access,” resolves the issue in favor
o f the Forest Service decision to m aintain the
m otorized portages.
W hile the D istrict C ourt opinion relies
prim arily on a series of definitional argu
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ments, the Appeals C ourt focuses m ore on
the institutional context of particular defini
tions. T he Appeals C ourt intends to elimi
nate contention over definitions by devoting
m uch of their opinion to determ ing which
institution’s definition should be authorita
tive in this situation. Thus, institutional argu
ments m ove into the foreground.

T h e A p p ea ls C ourt O p in io n
In reversing the District C ourt decision,
the Appeals C ourt develops a m uch more
succinct argum ent about the definition of
feasibility. It argues that the definition of
“feasible” is clear w hen considered in rela
tion to the congressional intent of the Bound
ary W aters Act. This turn of the argum ent to
Congressional intent is enabled by the
court’s use of Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council as a precedent case
providing the standard for review. In Chev
ron, the Suprem e C ourt argued that judicial
review of agency action m ust determ ine first
w hether the intent o f Congress is clear. If the
Appeals C ourt can show that the intent of
the A ct is clear, then it does not need to
engage in a detailed analysis of the legislative
history and compromises that w ent into the
Act, and it can dismiss attem pts by the
agency to redefine key terms.
T he court cites specific statutory language
from the Boundary W aters Act to argue that
Congress’s intent is clear. T he opinion states
that the A ct explicitly includes “preventing:
‘further road and commercial developm ent
and restoring natural conditions to existing
tem porary roads in the wilderness.’ Al
though som e m otorboats are allowed on the
lakes in issue, it is evident that congressional
intent was to discourage m otorized uses”
(Friends v. Robertson, 1992, 1487). Given this
purpose o f the Act, the court rejects the no
tion that feasible is an ambiguous w ord in
the statute:
T h e C h ie f s d ecisio n , as effectuated b y th e district
c o u rt’s ru lin g , as w ell as th e d issen t, re a d s in to the
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statute a n am b ig u ity w h ich d o es n o t exist. In a p p ly 
in g th e clearly e x p re sse d in te n t o f C o n g ress, w e can
o n ly c o n c lu d e th at ‘feasible’ m e a n s ‘c a p a b le o f b e in g
d o n e ’ o r ‘p h y sically p o ssib le,’ a n d as a m a tte r o f law ,
th e C h ie f e rre d in o rd e rin g th a t th e p o rtag es re m a in
o p e n (1488).

O n this basis, the court claims that closing
motorized portages “is consistent with the
Act;” allowing some portages to rem ain m o
torized is m erely “an exception to a clearly
expressed m andate” (1487).
Thus, in contrast to the District C ourt’s
assertion of ambiguity in the term “feasible,”
the Appeals C ourt eliminates ambiguity by
situating the term within the context of a
clear institutional m andate: m otorized uses
in wilderness areas are to be discouraged.
For both courts, then, argum ents about the
definition of “feasible” get resolved through
argum ents about which institution’s defini
tions have authority in a particular instance.
H ere, institutional m andates articulated by
Congress in the W ilderness A ct and B ound
ary W aters Act provide the grounds for the
court’s argum ent. Congress, rather than the
Forest Service, is the appropriate institu
tional authority regarding this definition.
T he argum ent for clear Congressional in 
tent, however, gets criticized in the dissent
ing opinion w ritten by Ju d g e Magill. In his
view, the court “has blindly adopted the def
inition of ‘feasible’ from other statutes w ith
out considering w hether Congress intended
to adopt that definition” (1490). Yet it is
arguable that the majority opinion does so.
T he m ajority opinion finds that the purposes
of the Boundary W aters Act itself are clear,
and then derives the m eaning of “feasible”
from these purposes. In addition, the m ajor
ity opinion invokes the definition of wilder
ness found in the W ilderness Act and then
infers that prohibiting m otorized portages is
“entirely consistent with the purposes an 
nounced in these Acts” (1487). So, the defi
nition of feasible in the m ajority opinion
depends on accepting the m eaning of feasi
ble within the context of the Boundary W a
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ters and W ilderness Acts, not blindly adopt
ing a definition stripped from another
context.
A lthough Magill’s opinion ultimately did
not win the day, his dissent reinforces my
point that argum ents about institutional au
thority are a crucial m eans for resolving ar
gum ents about definitions. For Magill, the
majority’s decision violates the institutional
authority that has been delegated to the For
est Service; in his view, it is inappropriate for
the court to engage in definitional arguments
that have the effect of dictating policy to the
agency. H e argues that Congress could have
clearly stated that they wanted the portages
term inated in 1984, but by leaving the pas
sage ambiguous they delegated this respon
sibility to the Forest Service. “Instead, C on
gress directed an executive agency to
interpret an ambiguous statutory term and to
determ ine at the end of the six-year period
w hether the portages should rem ain open”
(1491). Magill asserts that this direction must
not be taken lightly, since it is crucial in
m aintaining proper relationships between
branches of governm ent and prom oting re
sponsive governm ent.
B ecause C o n g ress d id n o t explicitly define ‘feasible
n o n m o to riz e d m e a n s ,’ I w o u ld d efer to th e F orest
S erv ice’s reaso n a b le d ecision. T h is co n clu sio n does
n o t im p ly a lack o f resp ec t for th e legislative b ra n c h ;
in stea d , I b eliev e it fosters resp ect. If C ongress clearly
directs, w e ju d g e s will follow . H e re , h o w ev er, it a p 
p e a rs th a t C o n g ress d e c id e d n o t to d e c id e th e status
o f th ese p o rtag es, a n d left th a t decisio n to th e agency.
B y d e fe rrin g to th e agency, w e re sp e c t th a t co n g res
sional d ecision. M o re o v e r, b y leav in g p o licy d e c i
sions to th e politically acco u n ta b le ag en cies rath er
th a n th e ju d ic ia ry , w e foster d e m o c ra tic a c c o u n ta b il
ity (1493).

Magill’s argum ent explicitly reveals the ten
sions betw een institutional authority and def
initional arguments. Definitions that have
the force of law are not determ ined merely
b y the best scientific, political, or ecological
argum ent; they are produced within institu
tional contexts. Thus, resolving definitional
questions not only requires argum ents about
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the definitions themselves; it also requires
argum ents about institutional authority over
those definitions.
Em pow ering definitions, then, has as
m uch to do with determ ining whose defini
tion counts as with generating a persuasive
definition. This relationship betw een defini
tional and institutional argum ents leads us to
consider the complexities behind Schiappa’s
assertion that “the only definitions of conse
quence are those that have been empowered
through persuasion or coercion” (1996,209).
In the Boundary W aters cases, definitions
are em pow ered in p art by m eans of persua
sion but ultimately by m eans of coercion.
Both the District C ourt and the Appeals
C ourt use a series of definitional arguments
to persuade audiences that a particular defi
nition of a term is reasonable. W hen the
courts argue that these definitions ultimately
are to be determ ined b y a specific governing
institution, how ever, they invoke the coer
cive pow er of the state to em pow er that in
stitution’s definitions as authoritative.
But the issue of whose definition counts
raises another issue that affects the em pow 
erm ent of a definition. In particular, I con
tend that in the realm of public policy, the
em pow erm ent of a definition is dependent
on the legitimacy of the institution authorized
to define the term , in addition to the dim en
sions of persuasion and coercion noted by
Schiappa. (While legitimacy is a product of
persuasion, it is analytically separate from
persuasion about the definition itself.) A def
inition will not be em pow ered if the institu
tion authorized to define it is not seen as
legitimate. So, even w hen a court invokes
the coercive pow er of the state to back an
institution’s definition, their focus on who
should define rather than w hat the definition
should be foregrounds the legitimacy or sta
tus of that institution in the eyes of public
advocates.
For exam ple, w hen the District C ourt sup
ported the Forest Service definition of “fea
sible,” public criticism em erged in p art b e
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cause the Forest Service was not seen as a
legitimate public agency by a significant set
of advocates. Preservation advocates felt that
the Forest Service had shut them out of de
cision-making and had failed to follow the
spirit of wilderness legislation in managing
the area. Given this view of the agency, the
District C ourt’s deferral to the Forest Service
did not successfully em pow er the definition
of “feasible,” in spite of the court’s consider
able efforts to persuade audiences that the
definition was reasonable. Thus, preserva
tion advocates appealed the District C ourt’s
decision.
T he B oundary W aters case, then, suggests
that neither persuasion nor coercion is suffi
cient to em pow er a definition. As argum ents
about institutional authority defer defini
tional questions to other institutions, those
definitions m ay n o t be fully em pow ered if
those institutions are not seen as legitimate.
An im portant effect of argum ents about in
stitutional authority, then, is that they can
revive larger questions about the legitimacy
of specific governing institutions. W e will see
further evidence of this in argum ents in the
controversy over snowmobile use in Denali
National Park. As in the B oundary W aters,
the issue of m otorized access to wilderness is
at the heart of the controversy. A nd, as in the
Boundary W aters, arguments about this is
sue ultimately turn toward argum ents about
which institution has authority to fix defini
tions for the practiced purpose o f m anage
ment.
D e f in in g “ A c c e s s ” a n d
“ T r a d i t i o n a l A c t iv it ie s ” :
T h e C ase of D enali
T he use of snowmobiles in D enali N a
tional Park has em erged as a public issue for
two m ain reasons. First, snowmobile access
has generated controversy because the pop
ularity of snowmobiling has rapidly in
creased in the past decade. Consequently,
private snowm obile associations and snow

1

140
WINTER 2002

RHETORICAL TRACTION

mobile m anufacturers have becom e identifi
able, active groups interested in influencing
park m anagem ent policies. Second, the in
creasing popularity of snowm obiling has led
to m ore use of the park by snowmobilers,
but the N ational Park Service has articulated
unclear policies and exercised inconsistent
enforcem ent regarding snowm obile opera
tion in Denali. As with the Boundary W a
ters, the legislation designating wilderness
areas inside the park contains ambiguous
terms that provide the grounds for com pet
ing argum ents about m otorized access.
The Alaska National Interest Lands C on
servation Act, or A N ILCA , is the main
source of ambiguity about m otorized access.
In 1980, Congress passed A N ILCA and ef
fectively divided D enali into two m ain areas;
the “O ld Park,” approxim ately two million
acres form erly called Mt. M cKinley National
Park, and another four million-acre area sur
rounding the O ld Park. N early all of the O ld
Park is now m anaged as wilderness. H ow 
ever, A N ILCA allows m otorized uses in a
portion of the wilderness u nder certain cir
cumstances. Section 811 of A N ILC A states
that the Secretary of the Interior shall perm it
use of snowmobiles, m otorboats and other
m eans of surface transportation by local res
idents for “subsistence uses.” In addition,
section 1110(a) allows the use of snowmachines and other m odes of m otorized trans
portation in the park for “traditional activi
ties” and “travel to and from villages and
homesites.” So, although the W ilderness Act
prohibits m otorized uses, A N ILCA p ro 
vided an exception in the case of use for
traditional activities and access to private
holdings. T he phrase “traditional activities”
did not get defined in the legislation, how 
ever, and this source of ambiguity provides
rhetorical traction for an array of argum ents
'about snowmobile access.
In addition to this definitional problem ,
A N ILCA also is a source of ambiguity re
garding institutional authority over m otor
ized use. Again, section 1110(a) provides the

relevant passage describing agency discre
tion in m anaging m otorized access:
S uch u se shall b e subject to rea so n a b le reg u latio n s by
th e S ecretary to p ro te c t th e n a tu ra l a n d o th e r values
o f th e co n serv a tio n system units, n a tio n a l recreatio n
areas, a n d n a tio n a l co n serv a tio n areas, a n d shall n o t
b e p ro h ib ite d unless, after no tice a n d h e a rin g in the
vicinity o f th e affected u n it o r area, th e S ecretary
finds th a t such use w o u ld b e d etrim e n ta l to the r e 
so u rce v alu es o f th e u n it o r area.

This passage suggests that institutional au
thority to regulate m otorized use ultimately
lies with the Secretary of the Interior. H ow 
ever, advocates for m otorized use challenge
this position, arguing that Congress estab
lished a clear rationale for m otorized access
in ANILCA. Thus, a second line of argu
m ent about access emerges regarding which
institution’s definitions should determ ine the
extent of m otorized access.
These definitional and institutional argu
ments coalesced when the D enali Park Su
perintendent issued tem porary regulations
in N ovem ber 1998 and February 1999 that
banned snowmobile use in the O ld Park.
T he Alaska State Snowmobile Association
took the Park Service to court, and in N o
vem ber 1999 the District C ourt rem anded
the decision to the Park Service. In this sec
tion of the essay, I will briefly exam ine pub
lic advocacy by the ASSA and the Park Ser
vice about those regulations before turning
to the District C ourt’s opinion. I draw atten
tion to the public advocacy in this contro
versy since those texts illustrate how easily
the definitional argum ents about access turn
into arguments about institutional authority,
even outside the judicial arena. T hen, as in
the Boundary W aters exam ple, I show how
the court opinion resolves those definitional
argum ents by way of institutional arguments.

In itia l P u b lic A rgu m en ts
T he definitional arguments of the N a
tional Park Service (NPS) and the Alaska
State Snowmobile Association (ASSA) at
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tem pt to establish w hat counts as permissible
access by showing how their position m ain
tains continuity in policies regarding access.
For the snowm obile group, m otorized access
has been a consistent feature of the O ld Park.
In the first paragraph of a 1997 article in
Alaskan Snow Rider entidcd, “D enali Park Ac
cess: N ext M ajor Issue Facing Snowm obil
ers,” ASSA Access C hair J o e G auna writes,
“Buses were taking people into the park as
early as the 1920s and a hotel and visitor
center was operated by the Alaska Railroad,
the only reasonable access other than the
prim itive D enali Highway.” H e goes on to
state that gradually, snowmobiles becam e
part of m otorized use as well, but the num 
ber of users was small and did n o t present a
significant problem . T hen in 1980, A N ILCA
m ade special provisions for m otorized access
to the wilderness portion of the park: “To
insure continued access, Congress specifi
cally addressed snowmobiles, m otorboats
and airplanes in ANILCA, affirming the
right to use them , even in ‘backcountry.’ ”
For the ASSA, this claim is central to their
argum ent that the O ld Park should be open
to snowmobile use. A N ILC A provides the
m ost recent legislative precedent for snow
m obile access, and points to Congress as the
institution with prim ary authority over that
access.
H ow ever, this argum ent overgeneralizes
the m eaning of access as described in
ANILCA. T h e ASSA article asserts that cit
izens have a broad right to m otorized access,
but it does not address A N ILCA ’s limita
tions on that right. Specifically, the article
ignores the fact that snowmobile access is
lim ited; they are only to be used in conjunc
tion with traditional activities such as h u n t
ing. A N ILCA articulates a clear relationship
betw een snowmobile use and other activi
ties: In the O ld Park, snow m achine use must
be instrumental; it is a m eans for pursuing
other activities, not an end in itself. T he
ASSA’s argum ent, then, overgeneralizes this
limited sense of access w hen it claims that

!

SCHWARZE

A N ILCA allows m otorized access. O nly
through this overgeneralization can they
m aintain their argum ent about a history of
continuous m otorized access.
In contrast, National Park Service press
releases build the case that prohibiting snow
mobiles in the O ld Park provides continuity
in policies regarding access. For exam ple, a
N ovem ber 1998 press release claims that the
regulations are a “continued closure” of the
O ld Park, and that traditional snowmachine
use “was not allowed in the form er M ount
M cKinley N ational Park” (National Park
Service, “Snowm achine”). Further, the NPS
argues that m otorized use of the area prior to
A NILCA also was illegal: “R ecreational use
of snowmachines in the form er M ount M c
Kinley National Park was neither customary
or [sic] traditional, and was, in fact prohib
ited by regulation.” A February 1999 press
release also emphasizes continuity by point
ing to specific sections o f ANILCA: “In the
form er M ount M cKinley National Park,
there was no history of authorized general
public snowmobile use for any activity, tra
ditional or otherwise. T he enactm ent of sec
tion 1110(a) of A N ILCA left this general
prohibition of snowmobile use in the old
park area intact unless the snowmobile use
was for the purpose of conducting a ‘tradi
tional activity’ ” (National Park Service,
“Portion"). Taken together, these claims de
pict an O ld Park from which snowmachines
have always been banned, thus suggesting
that the NPA has m aintained a continuous
policy regarding m otorized access.
These competing arguments about continu
ity of policy regarding access are grounded
in appeals to institutional authority. Argu
ments about institutional authority dom inate
the discussion of m otorized access in Denali.
Specifically, decisions about snowmobile ac
cess turn on arguments about which institu
tion has authority on this issue. As the con
troversy moves toward the judicial arena, the
ASSA and the NPS (as well as the W ilder
ness Society, an intervenor in the suit) all
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attem pt to articulate their substantive posi
tions on m anagem ent in term s of the appro
priate institutional decision-maker.
The ASSA, for example, questions whether
the park superintendent has authority to en
act regulations against snowm obile use. In
the ASSA’s N ovem ber 1997 article, G auna
hints that the superintendent’s authority over
snowmobile use is limited. H e claims that
Park Superintendent Steve M artin has taken
a definite position for keeping the O ld Park
m otor free and that M artin is pursuing his
personal preference rather than being ac
countable to requirem ents and regulations.
“[The superintendent] said that his legal p eo 
ple have told him that superintendent’s or
ders are not the pro p er way to im plem ent
snowmobile regulations (as well as som e oth
ers) and that’s why he is w orking on the
regulations package that includes the snow
m obile closure.” H ere, the threat of a super
intendent’s unbridled discretion hovers over
the m anagem ent process. T he ASSA article
raises an early concern about the superinten
dent overstepping his institutional authority.
T he ASSA continues to press the issue of
institutional authority in their response to the
tem porary regulations issued in February
1999, further raising questions about the le
gitimacy of the Park Service and their deci
sion-making procedures. They placed a copy
of the NPS announcem ent of the regulation
on their website and responded point-bypoint to a num ber of passages, and also p ro 
vided a link to a form letter that could be
emailed to the Superintendent. T he response
directly challenges the NPS claim that the
O ld Park has never been open to snow m o
biles, using statutory justification to support
their argum ent. T he ASSA states that
ANILCA “addressed snowmobiles, affirm
ing the right to use them in ‘back country’
areas (a designation given to the original
M ount M cKinley N ational Park).” Then,
they contrast this statutory justification with
the questionable foundation of the tem po
rary regulations: “W hat has happened is the
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D enali staff has prohibited snowmobile use
in this area through a ‘Superintendants [sic]
O rder,’ which is on shaky ground from a
legal standpoint.” This contrast m arks an im 
portant shift in the pattern of argument, as
they turn away from the continuity or con
sistency of the policy itself and begin to ques
tion the institutional, authority exercised to
prom ulgate the regulations.
Argum ents about institutional authority
are the basis not only of the ASSA lawsuit
challenging the regulations; interestingly,
they also are at the heart of the W ilderness
Society’s own lawsuit against the NPS and
their m otion opposing the ASSA suit. For
the ASSA, the tem porary regulations are too
restrictive; for the W ilderness Society, the
regulations are not restrictive enough. These
positions on m otorized access, however,
eventually get translated into arguments
about institutional authority during the
course of clarifying the policy. Ju st as the
ASSA argues that the superintendent does
not have the authority to close areas to snow
mobile use, the W ilderness Society argues
that the NPS does not have authority to keep
open two narrow corridors for snowmobile
use in the O ld Park. Thus, both advocacy
groups use the AN ILCA legislation to chal
lenge Park Service decisions that appear to
overstep the boundary between statutory
m andate and agency discretion. Arguments
about snowmobiles get rearticulated as argu
m ents about institutions.

T h e D istrict C ourt O p in io n
It is not surprising, then, that institutional
argum ents provide the ultimate basis for the
District C ourt opinion that rem anded the
agency’s decision on regulations to the Sec
retary of the Interior. This interpretation of
the court’s opinion differs from the interpre
tation offered in new spaper accounts of the
decision, which claim that the court’s opin
ion was based on a definitional issue: the
Park Service’s failure to define the phrase
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“traditional activities.” A lthough the NPS
did not define that phrase clearly, an analysis
of the opinion shows that arguments about
institutional authority serve as grounds for the
definitional argum ents and thus provide the
ultimate rationale for the court’s decision.
Institutional argum ents justify the accep
tance or rejection of a particular definition.
T he court’s opinion identifies the Secre
tary o f the Interior as having the institutional
authority to determ ine the appropriate defi
nition of “traditional activities.” T he opinion
begins by disposing argum ents that the court
should exam ine the legislative history of
A N ILCA to determ ine the legality of the
snowmobile ban: “O f course, as Justice Scalia has observed, it is the language o f statutes,
not the language of legislative history, which
is enacted as law by Congress. H ere, where
Congress failed to define ‘traditional activi
ties’ in A N ILCA , Congress did include a
statutory authorization em pow ering the Sec
retary to adopt regulations necessary to carry
out the law”
v. Babbitt 7). In this pas
sage, the court clarifies the delegation of au
thority from Congress to the administrative
agency, which gives the Secretary authority
to make regulations to execute the law.
Thus, the opinion invokes an argum ent
about institutional authority that allows the
court to situate the resolution of definitional
questions within a specific governing institu
tion.
Resituating the definitional question in
this way allows the court to establish a
straightforward definitional argum ent based
on the words of the Secretary. T he opinion
turns to the 1986 D enali regulations in which
the Secretary argues that there is no statutory
support in A N ILC A for banning snow m o
biles in the O ld Park. T hus, the opinion
relies on the prior argum ents of the control
ling institutional authority to determ ine the
definition that applies in this instance. R e
gardless of the definitions that are possible,
the Secretary’s definition is determ inative:
“Although the Secretary m ight have defined
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traditional activities in the m anner suggested
by W ilderness Society-the court does not
now decide w hether such an interpretation
could be consistent with A N IL C A -the Sec
retary has not done so. U nder these circum
stances, this court rejects W ilderness Soci
ety’s argum ent. It follows that the Decision
violates AN ILCA for the reason previously
explained” (9). In other words, the Secre
tary’s earlier interpretation found no statu
tory support for a ban, and thus the court is
obligated to follow the Secretary’s earlier
interpretation of the statute as definitive. By
appealing to the earlier argum ent of the con
trolling authority, the court finds that the
tem porary regulations of February 1999 vi
olate ANILCA.
Thus, it is not solely a definitional argu
m ent that grounded the court’s decision. The
definitional argum ent is em bedded within a
determ ination of whose definition and inter
pretation of the statute has authority. In this
case, the Secretary’s definition, ascertained
through analysis of previous regulations, de
termines the court’s judgm ent about the new
regulations. Since the ruling, the Park Ser
vice has drafted new regulations that address
the definitional problem surrounding “tradi
tional activities.” Nonetheless, these key def
initional assertions m ust com e from the ap
propriate institutional authority in order to
have rhetorical and legal force. In these
cases about m otorized access to wilderness,
then, argum ents about institutional authority
have rhetorical prim acy over arguments
about definitions.
T h e P r im a c y o f I n s t i t u t i o n a l
A r g u m e n t s : T h e o r e t ic a l a n d
P r a c t i c a l I m p l ic a t io n s
T he Boundary W aters and D enali cases
dem onstrate how argum ents about institu
tional authority play a crucial role in estab
lishing definitions used in the im plem enta
tion of public policy. N ot only do those
arguments help resolve definitional disputes,

I.
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b u t also they function to negotiate the legit
imacy o f governing institutions. T he illustra
tion of this process leads back to the theoret
ical issues surrounding definitions, institutional
arguments, and hegem ony raised in the in
troduction of this essay. In this section, I
elaborate on each of these areas by discuss
ing the im portance and rhetorical effects of
argum ents about institutional authority, us
ing exam ples from these cases to illustrate
m y arguments.
First, I suggested that this study contrib
utes to argum entation scholarship by speci
fying institutional argum ents as a significant
influence on definitions that get fixed as part
o f the policy process. T he Boundary W aters
and Denali cases described above show how
easily argum ents about the definitions of
term s like “feasible,” “access,” and “tradi
tional activities” are subsum ed by argum ents
about institutional authority.
The im portance of this influence emerges
w hen we consider one of the potential rhe
torical effects of institutional arguments. A r
guments about institutional authority allow the
courts to deflect definitional questions, with the
effect o f perpetuating political conflict over defini
tions. Both the Boundary W aters and Denali
cases show how a court’s deferral o f defini
tional questions prolongs rhetorical struggle
and moves it to other institutional sites. Take
the case of the B oundary W aters: the A p
peals C ourt’s argum ents about institutional
authority directed advocates to take their
claims to Congress. So, advocates who found
fault with the Appeals C ourt decision en
couraged Senator Rod Gram s and R epresen
tative Jim O berstar to hold Congressional
field hearings and propose new legislation
for Boundary W aters m anagem ent through
out the mid-1990s. R ather than settle a def
initional dispute, the C ourt’s argum ents
about institutional authority prolonged the
dispute and shifted it toward a different poli
cymaking forum (Jones and T aylor 331).
This shift o f forum points to the second
issue raised at the outset of this essay. I sug
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gested that argum ents about institutional au
thority function rhetorically to negotiate the
legitimacy of state institutions. W hen courts
assert that a particular institution Has the
authority to define a term for policy pur
poses, then questions of legitimacy emerge
for that institution. W ith every invocation of
an argum ent about institutional authority,
the courts imply that some other part of the
policy-making apparatus (Congress, the For
est Service, the Park Service) should be ac
cepted as the rightful definer of key terms.
H ow ever, this acceptance is based not only
on the court’s assertion of definitional au
thority; w hether that authority will be ac
cepted as legitimate depends upon the
broader public perception of the institution.
Thus, we can note a second im portant rhe
torical effect of institutional arguments. By
focusing on who should define the term
rather than on the definition itself, arguments
about institutional authority raise the issue o f an
institution’s legitimacy.
T he Boundary W aters and D enali cases
are especially useful for discussing the rela
tionship betw een institutional arguments
and legitimacy because they show how insti
tutional arguments can have divergent, un
even effects on the legitimacy of governing
institutions. In that regard, the cases provide
a useful counterpoint to D oxtader’s claim
that institutional justifications shut down
conflict in order to preserve institutional sta
bility. As he puts it, “Justificatory arguments
are sites w here the interests o f the public and
the institutional-instrumental process of sta
bility m aintenance m e e t . . . . Critique shows
how institutions collapse the relational ele
m ents of justificatory argum ent into a selfperpetuating argum ent form that reifies pro
cesses of public interest formation in the
nam e of pre-given norm s o f stability” (197).
Although a governing institution justifies its
decisions in order to stabilize relationships
between citizens and the institution, the wil
derness access cases reveal that institutional
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argum ents m ay stabilize some institutions
b u t can destabilize others.
For exam ple, in these cases argum ents
about institutional authority allow the courts
to bolster their legitimacy. W hen courts side
step definitional questions in favor of argu
m ents about institutional authority, they can
avoid the appearance of being “active”; de
ferral to agency definitions allows the courts
to appear that they are not legislating from
the bench. Creating this appearance is im 
portant for the courts in light of criticisms
that courts have squashed adm inistrative dis
cretion in reviewing agency decisions (for
criticisms see Rabkin, Shapiro; for a defense,
see Clayton). So, even as the courts engage
in definitional argum ents to support agency
interpretations or to specify Congressional
intent, their ultim ate argum ents about insti
tutional authority function to show that the
court is n o t overstepping its bounds. A rgu
m ents that focus on institutional authority
can help the courts appear as if they are not
actively intervening in agency decisionm ak
ing o r creating their own definitions of stat
utory terms. Thus, by subsum ing definitional
questions within argum ents about institu
tional authority, courts can minimize the ap
pearance of actively im posing their own pol
icy preferences and bolster their legitimacy.4
For other institutions, however, the defer
ral o f definitional questions back to Congress
or the agencies raises the issue of the legiti
m acy o f those institutions. As suggested
above, public acceptance of an institution’s
definitional authority depends on w hether
that institution is seen as legitimate. In both
4 In other instances, judicial opinions can bolster legit
im acy b y channeling dissent out o f institutional arenas.
T his is uie case w hen argum ents about institutional au
thority focus n o t on w hich institution has the authority to
establish a definition, b ut on w hether institutions should
h av e the pow er to define. Schiappa (2000) illustrates this
in his analysis o f constitutional disputes over abortion,
show ing how Ju stice O ’C onnor’s opinions have argued
th at th e “m eaning” of a pre-viability abortion is best left
to individual w om en rather than state institutions. By
delegating definitional authority back into civil society,
the courts rely on an im plicit appeal to “the people” to
further bolster th eir legitimacy.
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the Boundary W aters and Denali cases, for
example, public acceptance of an agency’s
definition hinged on the perception of those
agencies as adhering to the m andates of
Congress (in the Boundary W aters) and
m aking decisions that were n o t m erely per
sonal preference of agency personnel (in D e
nali). These perceptions of legitimacy are
brought into the foreground when courts
claim that a particular institution has author
ity to establish definitions. H ence, arguments
about institutional authority need to be as
sessed with regard to the range of potential
effects on governing institutions. Institu
tional arguments do not necessarily shore up
the stability of institutions; they may
heighten the legitimacy of one institution,
and bring another institution’s legitimacy
problem s into sharp relief.
These divergent and uneven effects of in
stitutional argum ents on legitimacy are in
structive for the study of hegem ony and the
role of the rhetoric of state institutions in the
formation of consent, the third issue raised at
the outset of this essay. Specifically, the diver
gent effects o f institutional arguments on legiti
macy make those arguments especially useful for
examining the role that state institutions play in
the constitution o f hegemony. T he implications I
have already drawn show how institutional
arguments are productive of both consent
and dissent. T o the extent that arguments
about institutional authority generate some
degree of adherence to state institutions,
w hether through unspoken agreem ent or the
ongoing disagreements within other institu
tional forums, it m ay be argued that these
arguments are productive o f consent to state
institutions. T hat is, participation in or acqui
escence to the policy process m ay be taken
as a sign that a basic level of legitimacy has
been achieved by state institutions as a
whole. In this view, dissent is m anaged by
transferring conflict from one institution to
another, and the state continues to exercise
hegem ony over the transformation of wild
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ness into “wilderness” (for an extrem e form
o f this argum ent, see Birch).
But shifting the conflict to another institu
tion m ay encourage advocates to further
question the legitimacy of that institution.
T he courts’ argum ents about institutional au
thority draw attention to the institutions
themselves, to whose definition should have
authority. So, even as conflicts get trans
ferred from one institution to the another,
that m ay only reinforce negative perceptions
o f those institutions. If a court opinion
m erely ratifies the authority of an alreadym aligned agency, that ratification does little
to bolster the agency’s legitimacy and
heightens the sense that the agency is insu
lated from public criticism. Further, the
transfer o f conflict from one forum to an
other m ay dam age the legitimacy of the state
as a whole, if it appears that none of the
institutions can provide a decisive definition
or policy (W ondolleck 105-118). To the ex
tent that argum ents about institutional au
thority provoke generalized dissatisfaction
with state institutions, these argum ents can
generate dissent even as they attem pt to dis
place it.
A ttention to how state rhetorics generate
both consent and dissent provides an im por
tant qualification and addition to dom inant
theorizations of hegem ony within rhetorical
scholarship. M y argum ent above about the
divergent and uneven effects of institutional
argum ents on legitimacy reinforces the com 
m on claim that the exercise of hegem ony is
best characterized as the dynam ic process of
producing consent rather than the m ono
lithic imposition of a dom inant ideology
(Condit). H ow ever, producing consent does
not only consist of forging an accom m oda
tion on substantive, definitional issues. Hege
mony also requires the production o f consent to the
procedural, institutional means by which substan
tive issues get resolved. As I have argued here
and elsewhere, institutional argum ents m ay
be productive of hegem ony to the extent that
they channel further disagreem ent within in
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stitutional boundaries, but they also may
function to undercut hegem ony to the extent
that they erode the legitimacy of governing
institutions (Schwarze). Thus, scholars con
cerned with the rhetorical dimensions of h e
gem ony would do well to include the argu
ments of governing institutions in their
analyses, and to address the m ultiple levels
on which those argum ents contribute to the
production of consent.
This analysis of institutional arguments,
then, suggests how studies of hegem ony
m ight be com plem ented by turning a critical
eye toward the rhetorics of governing insti
tutions. So far work on hegem ony within
com m unication studies has tended to focus
on civil society rhetorics.5 This focus on
stems in part from a reading of Gramsci that
relies on a sharp distinction between the
State and civil society, where the term “he
gem ony” nam es the type of leadership exer
cised in civil society and “dom ination” char
acterizes the coercive pow er of the state. In
this reading, hegem ony produces consent
am ong citizens; w hen consent dissolves, the
State apparatus exercises dom ination
through repressive force. An early passage in
Prison Notebooks captures this distinction con
cisely:
W h a t w e c a n d o, for th e m o m e n t, is to fix tw o m ajor
su p e rstru ctu ral “ levels” : th e o n e th a t ca n b e called
“civil society”, th a t is th e e n sem b le o f organism s
c o m m o n ly called “p riv a te ”, a n d th a t o f “political
so ciety ” o r “th e S tate.” T h e se tw o levels co rre sp o n d
o n th e o n e h a n d to th e function o f “h e g e m o n y ”
w hich th e d o m in a n t g ro u p exercises th ro u g h o u t so
ciety a n d o n th e o th e r h a n d to th a t o f “d ire c t dom i-

5 C ondit’s w ork on reproductive technologies analyzes
popular m agazine an a national new spaper articles.
C loud develops h er critique of C ondit’s view of hege
m ony via an analysis o f television and m agazine biogra
phies o f O p rah VVinfrey. H anke an d D ow exam ine tele
vision shows in o rder to exam ine hegem onic versions of
m asculinity and fem ininity, respectively. A nd while
M um by does n ot undertake an em pirical study in his
essay on hegem ony, he does argue that G ram sci’s atten
tion to civil society should be em ulated in future critical
scholarship, since it “creates greater possibilities for ex
am ining gaps an d fissures in the prevailing ideology”
(365).
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n a tio n ” o r c o m m a n d ex ercise d th ro u g h th e S tate a n d
“ju rid ica l” g o v e rn m e n t (12).

This passage gets invoked by M um by (347)
and C ondit (206) to w arrant the focus on
civil society. As M um by puts it, “hegem ony
resides prim arily in the realm of civil society
(although it can be exercised also by the
State)” (348). In spite of this admission about
the role of the state in producing hegem ony,
there has been little exam ination of that role
within com m unication studies.6 Scholars
have produced num erous studies of the h e
gem onic and counter-hegem onic rhetorics
within civil society, but they have barely
explored the state’s role in hegem ony or
problem atized Gram sci’s explanation of the
relationship betw een civil society and the
state.
N ear the end of the Prison Notebooks, how 
ever, Gramsci explicitly links state institu
tions to the exercise of hegem ony. In a sec
tion on the separation of state powers,
Gram sci suggests that each of the branches
of the state have an im portant hegem onic
function: “N aturally all three pow ers are also
organs of political hegem ony: 1. Legislature;
2. Judiciary; 3. Executive” (246). H ere,
Gramsci hints that governing institutions can
function as sites at w hich hegem ony is exer
cised. A t these sites, the state contributes to
hegem ony n o t simply in the form of coer
cion or direct dom ination, but by rhetori
cally producing consent and m anaging dis
sent with regard to the exercise of state
pow er. W hen the courts, administrative
agencies, and legislative bodies produce ar
gum ents that define and justify public policy,
those institutions contribute to the hege
m onic process by articulating provisional ac
com m odations on public policy and negoti
6 T h e exception to this claim is M. L inda M iller’s essay
o n how legislative d ebate transform ed m any o f the p u b 
lic argum ents surrounding m idwifery legislation in Flor
ida. H er essay suggests that institutional com m itm ents
constrain the rhetoric produced in legislative bodies; m y
essay suggests that sim ilar sorts o f com m itm ents con
strain the argum ents p roduced by courts.
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ating state legitimacy. T he introduction of
this essay intended to display a specific ex
am ple of this contribution. State institutions
directly influence m y experience of wilder
ness, n o t by influencing m y perceptions of
wilderness, or by offering a philosophical
defense of w hat wilderness ought to be, but
b y determ ining which institution gets to de
fine the term s by which practical, material
m anagem ent decisions are m ade. By exam 
ining these institutional argum ents, then,
rhetorical scholars can better understand the
full range of voices that influence the opera
tion of hegem ony.
In a practical vein, the im portance of in
stitutional arguments dem onstrated in this
essay suggests that advocates can gain rhe
torical traction by appealing to institutional
concerns in controversies on other public
lands. W e can already see evidence of this in
one of the m ost notable controversies m en
tioned at the beginning of this essay: snow
m obile access in Yellowstone N ational Park.
T he W inter U se Plan for Yellowstone and
G rand Teton N ational Parks, released in N o
vem ber 2000, proposed a phased-out ban on
snowmobiles in those parks by the w inter of
2003-2004. Even before the plan was re
leased, advocates em ployed institutional ar
guments to raise concerns about the legiti
m acy of the agency’s Plan. For example,
Representative Barbara C ubin (R-WY)
claimed that the Park Service failed to in
clude the public in planning and fulfill other
institutional responsibilities as required by
law. “Throughout the process, the National
Park Service has disregarded the views of the
public, the application of sound science and
the Administrative Procedures Act” (Graver,
B l). T hen in Ju n e 2001, the D epartm ent of
the Interior essentially overturned the plan,
setding a lawsuit brought against the agency
by the International Snowmobile M anufac
turers Association. T he settlem ent lifted the
snowmobile ban and required a new envi
ronm ental study to be com pleted in 2002
(“Politics, N ot Science”). As this settlem ent
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was being developed, critics com plained that
the Bush adm inistration had inappropriately
exercised its institutional authority, ignoring
the Park’s extensive environm ental im pact
statem ent and shutting out local park person
nel from settlem ent discussions. In the words
of form er Yellowstone Park Superintendent
Mike Finley: “H ad the Park been asked, we
would have resisted setdem ent and sought a
vigorous defense. W e w ere n o t asked. In
over six and a half years at Yellowstone, I
was involved in every m ajor and m inor law
suit. I was co n su lted
This is the first time
the opinion of the Park was not sought, or
solicited, or considered by the adm inistra
tion” (G reater Yellowstone Coalition).
These argum ents underscore that battles
over access on federal lands often get fought
at the level of institutional authority. A dvo
cates thus would do well to consider how
argum ents about institutional authority
could be used to influence the policy p ro 
cess. In particular, advocates for minim izing
snowmobile use could benefit by em phasiz
ing the Congressional m andate to preserve
parks unim paired for future generations, and
by questioning the legitimacy of an adm in
istration that overturns its own agency’s pol
icy. T he latter argum ent is especially im por
tant in this instance, given that the NPS
policy was based on over a decade of thor
ough scientific studies and three years of
public com m ent on m anagem ent proposals.
T he assertion of institutional authority by the
Secretary of the Interior in this situation
raises serious questions about the adm inis
tration’s legitimacy.
C o n c l u s io n
M y m ost recent wilderness excursion took
a friend and m e into the G reat Bum , an area
in the Bitterroot M ountains straddling the
M ontana-Idaho border. This ragged m aze of
ridges, creeks and high m ountain lakes was
in the h eart of the forest fires o f 1910 that
burned over 3 million acres of national for
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ests in M ontana and Idaho. W e knew that
the area was proposed for wilderness desig
nation and had heard several great reports
about the backcountry hiking there. W e
thought it would be an ideal place for a
weekend in the wilderness.
M y friend and I were especially disap
pointed, then, w hen we arrived at Fish Lake.
After a dem anding hike that took us along
the M ontana-Idaho border ridge and chal
lenged us with several ascents and descents,
we looked forward to a quiet, relaxing
evening by a rem ote wilderness lake. In
stead, as we descended into Fish Lake we
were greeted by w hat we thought at first
were chain saws. But as we got closer, it was
apparent that the sounds w ere com ing from
all-terrain vehicles. W e were no longer in the
backcountry; we w ere in ATV-Land.
This affected our “wilderness” experience
in several ways. T he constant A TV traffic
past our campsite and the random start-up of
the m achines elim inated the possibility for
uninterrupted, quiet solitude, which was why
I took the trip in the first place. Further, even
in the m iddle o f another dry summer, the
hiking trails are packed relatively hard and
create negligible am ounts of dust. But at the
point where our trail m et the trail being used
by A T Vs, the soil turned into a fine dust that
hung in the air and on the trees, and quickly
becam e a part of our meal and our sleeping
bags. M ost of all, it ruined w hat was other
wise a great day. It was disappointing to
work that hard, get ten miles into the backcountry, and then have to deal with an un
expected, unw anted intrusion.
It is easy to dismiss these concerns as spe
cial pleading from a backpacker who wants
to have the wilderness all to himself, who
believes that som e forms of recreation are
“better” than others, and who simply wants
his way. To be sure, there are good philo
sophical and environm ental arguments that
support the com plete elimination of m otor
ized access in wilderness areas. But those
arguments are not necessary here. Even my
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friend, a great outdoorsm an but certainly not
som eone who identifies him self as an envi
ronm entalist, openly expressed his disap
pointm ent about the experience. In this sit
uation, it is less a m atter of philosophy than
a m atter of expectations, a certain trust that
the Forest Service will m anage public lands
in accordance with the law.
This failure to m anage in accordance with
law erodes the legitimacy of the Forest Ser
vice and connects this case to the problem s I
have already outlined with m anagem ent in
the Boundary W aters and Denali. In the case
of the G reat Bum , the problem again stems
from a definitional issue and an issue of in
stitutional authority. T he G reat B um area is
m anaged by two different National Forests,
the Lolo N F on the M ontana side and the
Clearw ater N F on the Idaho side. Each For
est is legally required to m anage in accor
dance with its Forest Plan (the official m an
agem ent docum ent, revised every 10-15
years). O n both the Lolo and the Clearwater,
Forest Service personnel are directed to
m anage large portions of the G reat B um
(including the Fish Lake area) as wilderness
until a statutory decision is m ade about the
area. T he plans direct the Forest Service to
“protect the wilderness character of p ro 
posed wilderness areas until Congress makes
classification decisions” (Clark). N ot surpris
ingly, the phrase “wilderness character” is
open to definitional dispute, and the two
Forests have operationally defined this
phrase in contrasting ways. O n the Lolo,
protecting wilderness character m eans ex
cluding m otorized use, while on the C lear
w ater m anagers have allowed m otorized use
in proposed wilderness. Given these con
trasting exercises of agency discretion, three
environm ental groups have filed suit to p ro 
hibit motorized access on areas proposed as
wilderness o n the C learw ater, arguing that
the Clearw ater’s m anagem ent practices have
degraded the area’s “wilderness character.”
As in the other wilderness access cases,
one can anticipate that the decision about

the G reat B um will turn on arguments about
w hich institution has authority to define “wil
derness character.” W hether that authority
lies at the Forest level, with the C hief of the
Forest Service, o r with Congress and its def
inition in the W ilderness Act, m y excursion
into the G reat B um m ade it all too clear that
the placem ent of definitional authority has a
significant effect on w hat m ight ultimately
pass for wilderness. M erely passing across a
state border, from one National Forest into
an adjacent Forest, fundam entally altered
the character of wilderness. T hat experience
reinforced the underlying assumption of this
essay: argum ents about institutional author
ity offer a fruitful area for research, not only
for the purpose of advancing theories of ar
gum entation and hegem ony, but also for the
purpose o f preparing public advocates to
engage and criticize hegem onic accom m o
dations produced by state institutions.
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